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CAN YOU RELATE? BRISTOL-MYERS NARROWED THE 
RELATEDNESS REQUIREMENT BUT CHANGED LITTLE IN THE 
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION  
Today, it is a basic principal that personal jurisdiction must be properly 
established before a lawsuit can go forward. If a party so chooses, personal 
jurisdiction can be waived and the court can continue to adjudicate the claim.1 
Often, however, defendants will challenge personal jurisdiction in order to get 
the case dismissed from a particular forum. Despite the essentiality of personal 
jurisdiction, the laws guiding the concept have never been truly settled, likely 
because it is a product of court-made law stemming from Constitutional 
penumbras rather than promulgated statutory rules.2  
The most recent development in the ever-evolving world of personal 
jurisdiction comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bristol-Myers,3 which 
attempts to narrow the scope of the relatedness requirement of the specific 
jurisdiction analysis. This article argues that the Court’s fact-specific holding 
failed to establish a bright line test for finding a sufficient level of relatedness 
between a plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s contact with a forum, and as 
such, it will not greatly alter or impact the specific jurisdiction analysis. Further, 
the opinion is not likely to result in a great degree of negative consequences for 
plaintiffs litigating in mass actions.  
Part I discusses the historical background of personal jurisdiction, including 
relevant developments that have led to today’s specific jurisdiction analysis to 
which the Bristol-Myers opinion adds. Part II discusses how two different states 
took opposite positions on the relatedness requirement before the Supreme Court 
decided the issue on appeal. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the relatedness requirement and examines how lower courts have 
subsequently applied the Bristol-Myers reasoning in personal jurisdiction 
analyses. Finally, Part IV discusses the concerns raised by the opinion about 
mass action litigation and attempts to dispel those concerns.  
 
 1. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). 
 2. See i.e. Cal.C.C.P. § 410.10 (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis 
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”). 
 3. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S. 
Ct. 1773 (2017). 
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I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Beginnings: Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction 
The notion of personal jurisdiction has been developed based on the 
concepts of territoriality and state sovereignty.4 The first conception of personal 
jurisdiction arose in 1877, when the Supreme Court held in the case of Pennoyer 
v. Neff that a person’s consent or presence in the state was required in order for 
him to be sued within a state.5 The Court’s holding rested on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the policy that states should have 
jurisdictional sovereignty over the people and property within them.6 
Ever since Pennoyer first applied constitutional limits to states’ exercise of 
personal jurisdiction, there has been an abundance of confusion and frustration 
because of the lack of a coherent theory to guide predictable outcomes.7 To this 
day, courts are still continuing and struggling to develop the law of personal 
jurisdiction, piece by piece, but concerns of Due Process remain at the heart of 
the issue.8 
B. Minimum Contacts: International Shoe 
Decades after Pennoyer, International Shoe considered when a person’s 
presence in a state is sufficient under the Pennoyer framework to establish 
personal jurisdiction.9 The Court held Due Process requires that in order to 
subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction, he must have certain minimum 
contacts with the state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.10 The Court, in dicta, 
considered a framework for what it considered to be sufficient minimum 
contacts: if systematic and continuous contacts gave rise to the suit, jurisdiction 
was proper; however, a single and isolated contact with the state, unconnected 
to the suit, is insufficient to establish minimum contacts for jurisdictional 
purposes.11  
There are also other in-between situations in which the minimum contact 
analysis may be met. It is from these in-between situations that the notions of 
 
 4. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in 
the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1681 (2017). 
 5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New Equilibrium 
in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 207, 263 (2014). 
 8. Id. at 264 (2014) (arguing that a state must have authority to regulate conduct intended to 
obtain benefits of its laws, otherwise, the essential element of sovereignty would be lost). 
 9. International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and 
Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 10. Id. at 316. 
 11. Id. at 318-19. 
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general and specific jurisdiction were born.12 General jurisdiction follows from 
the court’s acknowledgment that there are times when continuous corporate 
operations within a state are so substantial and of such a nature that suit is 
justified in that state on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities.13 Further, specific jurisdiction follows from 
acknowledgment that some isolated contacts, because of their nature, quality, 
and the circumstances of their commission, may be sufficient to render a 
corporation liable to suit in that state.14  
C. General Jurisdiction: Daimler and Goodyear 
Goodyear and Daimler defined the current general jurisdiction test.15 These 
cases established that mere proof that a corporation does continuous and 
systematic business in a state is insufficient for purposes of general 
jurisdiction.16 Such interpretation of general jurisdiction would be exceedingly 
broad, and large national corporations were being subject to suit all over the 
country.17  
The general jurisdiction inquiry is not whether a corporation’s in-state 
contacts are merely continuous and systematic, but rather whether the 
corporation’s affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to 
render it essentially at home in the forum state.18 Daimler has established a 
corporation can only be considered “at home” in the state of its incorporation 
and in the state where it has its principal place of business.19 
D. Specific Jurisdiction 
Specific jurisdiction does not have a bright line test like the “at home” test 
for general jurisdiction and has been developing and evolving ever since 
International Shoe. In order to better shape the concept of specific jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court in McGee and Denckla elaborated on the minimum contacts 
test, developing the idea of deliberate contacts – a defendant must have 
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of exercising some business in the 
state.20  
 
 12. Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to 
(Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 433 (2017). 
 13. Id.; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 16. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 
 17. Id. at 761-62. 
 18. Id. at 761. 
 19. Id. at 760-61. 
 20. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
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In 1980, World-Wide Volkswagen built on the notion of deliberate contacts 
and established the three-part specific personal jurisdiction test that is used 
today.21 The Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional 
when: 1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum state, or in 
other words, he had contacts with the state and the contacts were purposeful and 
deliberate; 2) the plaintiff’s claim arose out of those contacts; and 3) exercising 
personal jurisdiction is reasonable based on a consideration of factors including 
the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in 
convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in 
obtaining the most effective resolution, and the shared interest in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.22 
Since then, the Supreme Court has further analyzed each of these three 
factors. The Court has examined the element of purposeful availment many 
times.23 There is little dispute as to what constitutes a corporation purposefully 
availing itself of a particular forum state, notwithstanding a lingering dispute 
regarding whether placing goods in the stream of commerce satisfies purposeful 
availment.24 When in doubt whether purposeful availment is satisfied, facts 
demonstrating reasonableness will influence the satisfaction of this element.25  
Until recently, the Supreme Court had neglected to further interpret the 
second element of the World-Wide Volkswagen test – whether the plaintiff’s 
claim arises out of the defendant’s purposeful availment or contacts with the 
forum state, otherwise known as the “relatedness requirement.”26 Several state 
supreme courts delivered opinions on this issue, coming to opposite 
conclusions.27 The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari 
on one of those cases and attempted to shed light on whether this requirement is 
met when the defendant is a nationwide company whose minimum contacts 
reach every state, and a nonresident plaintiff is harmed in some way by the 
defendant.28  
 
 21. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 
(1984); Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 
102, 112 (1987). 
 24. Asahi, 480 U.S. 1987 at 112. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 907 (Cal. 2016). 
 27. Id.; State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Mo. 
2017). 
 28. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (2017). 
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II.  DISAGREEMENT OVER THE SCOPE OF THE RELATEDNESS REQUIREMENT 
Recently, two state supreme courts opined on the relatedness requirement, 
reaching opposite interpretations of its scope.29 The Supreme Court of California 
held that the requirement was satisfied when nonresident plaintiffs were harmed 
by the same type of harmful conduct in which the defendant was engaged in the 
forum state.30 In Missouri, the supreme court held that though the same type of 
conduct occurred in the forum state, the plaintiff’s claims were not sufficiently 
related to the forum contacts.31 The reasoning from these cases and their dissents 
influenced the Supreme Court’s opinion on the issue. 
A. Broad Interpretation: California Supreme Court 
1. Factual Background 
In March 2012, eight complaints were filed in California state court on 
behalf of 678 individuals against Bristol-Myers Squibb.32 All of the individuals 
named as plaintiffs in the suits had been prescribed and had taken Plavix, a drug 
made by the defendant, and as a result suffered adverse consequences such as 
bleeding, ulcers, heart attacks, stroke, and even death.33 The complaints all 
alleged causes of action sounding in California state law, but Bristol-Myers 
Squibb argued that the court had no personal jurisdiction over it with regard to 
the plaintiffs who were not California residents.34  
Of the 678 plaintiffs, only eighty-six were residents of California, while the 
rest resided in thirty-three other states.35 Bristol-Myers Squibb was incorporated 
in Delaware, had its headquarters in New York, and had its most substantial 
operations in New Jersey where it employed nearly 6,500 people.36 In 
comparison, Bristol-Myers Squibb only employed about 250 sales 
representatives in California.37 Although the company sold millions of Plavix 
pills to distributors in California, the California sales of Plavix constituted just 
over one percent of the company’s overall sales revenue.38 Bristol-Myers Squibb 
had a few research facilities and laboratories in California; however, there was 
no evidence that these facilities did work on Plavix.39 
 
 29. See generally Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d 887; Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d 48. 
 30. See Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 890-91. 
 31. See Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 49. 
 32. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 877, 878. 
 33. Id. at 878. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 879. 
 37. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 879. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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2. Broad Application of the Relatedness Requirement 
The California Supreme Court considered whether Bristol-Myers Squibb’s 
contacts with California were sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in 
regards to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.40 There was no question that 
Bristol-Myers Squibb purposefully availed itself of California by marketing and 
advertising there, employing sales representatives there, contracting with 
distributors there, and operating facilities there.41 Further, the court held that the 
assertion of specific jurisdiction was not unreasonable.42 Thus, the heart of the 
dispute was whether the relatedness requirement was met.  
The court ultimately concluded that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims arose 
out of or were connected to the defendant’s forum contacts and as such, personal 
jurisdiction was proper.43 The court employed a broad interpretation of the 
relatedness requirement by using a “substantial connection” test, which instructs 
that there must be a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s 
activities in the forum and the plaintiff’s claim.44 The court further explained 
that a claim need not arise directly from, or be proximately caused by the 
defendant’s contacts for jurisdiction to be proper; only when the operative facts 
are not related to the defendant’s contacts can the cause of action be said to not 
arise from the contact.45 
Applying this reasoning to the facts, the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims 
did in fact arise out of the defendant’s California conduct. The company engaged 
in a nationwide Plavix marketing and distribution campaign that reached 
California and all other states alike, and this nationwide campaign created a 
substantial nexus to the plaintiffs’ claims that dealt with said marketing and 
distribution, including fraudulent advertising, design, manufacture, and 
nondisclosure of material information about Plavix.46 Further, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb had several research and laboratory facilities located in California, and 
the activities that took place in these facilities created an additional nexus to the 
plaintiffs’ claims of negligent research, development, and design of the drug 
itself.47 
The court rejected the idea that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were 
merely parallel to the resident plaintiffs’ claims. Rather, the claims were all 
based on a single, coordinated nationwide course of conduct directed from its 
 
 40. Id. at 894. 
 41. Id. at 886-87. 
 42. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 891-94. 
 43. Id. at 890-91. 
 44. Id. at 885, 887. 
 45. Id. at 885. 
 46. Id. at 888. 
 47. Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 888. 
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headquarters and implemented across the country.48 Thus, the nationwide 
marketing and distribution in effect gave rise to all of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
B. Narrow Interpretation: Missouri Supreme Court 
1. Factual Background 
In February of 2017, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed the 
relatedness requirement in a single-plaintiff personal injury case.49 The plaintiff, 
an Indiana resident, filed a personal injury action against Norfolk Southern 
Railway for cumulative trauma sustained during his employment with the 
company in Indiana.50 The plaintiff filed suit in Missouri, and Norfolk Southern 
argued that Missouri could not properly exercise personal jurisdiction over it.51  
Although Norfolk Southern did systematic and continuous business in 
Missouri, those activities were insufficient for general jurisdiction for all causes 
of action unrelated to that state.52 Norfolk Southern, a Virginia company, had 
railroad tracks running through Missouri as well as twenty-two other states.53 It 
had about 600 employees in Missouri, yet employed more than 600 people in 
thirteen other states.54 The company generated substantial revenue in Missouri, 
but that revenue only comprised about two percent of the corporation’s overall 
revenue.55 Thus, the plaintiff was required to rely on specific jurisdiction.56 
Because the plaintiff did not plead any facts alleging that his injury arose 
from the company’s Missouri activities, his claim for specific jurisdiction rested 
on the argument that his injuries arose in Indiana from the same type of activities 
that the defendant conducts in Missouri. He argued that because Norfolk 
Southern engaged in railroad business in Missouri, and his injuries arose out of 
railroad business in Indiana, the claims were sufficiently related to the 
company’s contacts in Missouri.57 
2. Narrow Application of the Relatedness Requirement 
The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument and held there was no 
specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims.58 Though Norfolk Southern 
undoubtedly purposefully availed itself in Missouri, the suit could not be brought 
 
 48. Id. at 889-90. 
 49. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d at 44. 
 50. Id. at 44-45. 
 51. Id. at 45. 
 52. Id. at 48. 
 53. Id. at 45. 
 54. Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 47. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 48. 
 57. Id. at 49. 
 58. Id. 
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in Missouri because the claims were not sufficiently related to the company’s 
Missouri contacts.59 No level of but-for causation connected the individual’s 
personal injury allegations to the company’s presence in Missouri, and as such, 
the claims did not arise out of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the 
forum.60 
The court noted that the plaintiff’s argument employed a “pre-Daimler 
approach.”61 If a company did the same type of business all over the country, it 
would become subject to specific jurisdiction in all states, thereby defeating the 
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction.62  
Although Norfolk Southern differs in many ways from Bristol-Myers, in 
both cases, plaintiffs argued that specific jurisdiction was proper when the 
plaintiffs’ injuries arose from the same “type” of activities that the defendant 
conducted in the forum state. California held that these sorts of parallel claims 
constituted a substantial connection as to meet the relatedness element.63 
Missouri held otherwise.64 The Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari of the Bristol-Myers Squibb case to decide the issue.65 
III.  CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE RELATEDNESS REQUIREMENT 
In a June 19, 2017 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the California 
Supreme Court by way of reasoning similar to that employed by the Missouri 
Supreme Court.66 The holding effectively narrowed the scope of the relatedness 
requirement, yet courts are still left much discretion in deciding what level of 
causation or relatedness is sufficient for specific jurisdiction based on the facts 
of each case. 
A. Narrowing the Scope: The Bristol-Myers Decision 
1. Due Process is the Ultimate Consideration 
The Court’s opinion was predicated on the underlying two-fold policy 
rationale for personal jurisdiction restrictions. The first concern is the burden 
placed on the defendant – courts must assess any practical problems that would 
result from requiring a defendant to litigate in a given forum.67 Personal 
 
 59. Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 49. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 50. 
 63. See Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 878. 
 64. See Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 44. 
 65. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S. 
Ct. 827, 827 (2017). 
 66. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 67. Id. at 1780. 
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jurisdiction restrictions thus act as a guarantee of immunity from burdensome, 
inconvenient, or distant litigation.68  
The second concern is protection of federalism and the legitimate interests 
of the states in adjudicating cases.69 Personal jurisdiction restrictions ensure 
certain territorial limitations and protect the sovereignty of the states.70 The 
Court suggested that this second concern overrides the first – even though 
Bristol-Myers Squibb would suffer no inconvenience from litigating in 
California, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, nevertheless divests the state from adjudicating the controversy.71 
2. Reversing the California Supreme Court 
The Court ultimately reversed the California Supreme Court and held that 
Bristol-Myers Squibb was not subject to specific jurisdiction in California with 
regard to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.72 It held that the plaintiffs’ claims, 
arising merely from the same type of activities the defendant conducted in the 
forum, were not sufficiently related to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s California 
contacts.73 
In so holding, the Court relied on several important facts. First, the defendant 
did not develop, manufacture, label, package, or create a marketing strategy for 
Plavix in California.74 Additionally, though the defendant contracted with 
California distributors, the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege they obtained 
Plavix through California sources, nor did they claim they were injured or 
treated for injuries in California.75 Finally, there was no evidence that Plavix 
itself was designed or developed in any of the company’s California research or 
laboratory facilities.76  
Considering the foregoing facts, the conduct that gave rise to the nonresident 
plaintiffs’ claims occurred entirely outside of California.77 Specific jurisdiction 
is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from or connected with the very 
controversy that establishes jurisdiction, and the court noted it could not be said 
that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were derived from or connected to Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s conduct in California.78 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780-81. 
 72. Id. at 1782. 
 73. Id. at 1781. 
 74. Id. at 1778. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779. 
 77. Id. at 1782. 
 78. Id. at 1780, 1782. 
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3. Narrowing the Relatedness Requirement 
The Court’s holding demonstrated an attempt to narrow the scope of the 
relatedness requirement. The Court stated that “the mere fact that some plaintiffs 
were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California” and sustained 
injuries similar to those of the nonresident plaintiffs, does not necessarily allow 
California to convey jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.79 
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s relationship with third parties – here, the California 
plaintiffs – was an insufficient basis for extension of jurisdiction to nonresidents, 
even when the third parties brought similar claims.80 The Court’s reasoning was 
in line with the Missouri Supreme Court – rejecting the notion that out-of-state 
claims arising from the same “type” of activity conducted by a defendant in the 
forum state constitute a sufficient level of relatedness so as to say that the 
plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts in the forum. 
B. Questions Remaining After Bristol-Myers 
Two questions remained to be answered in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision.81 The first question, whether the Bristol-Myers holding applies to mass 
actions only or class actions alike, arises from Justice Sotomayor’s dissent where 
she queries whether the opinion would also apply to a class action in which the 
plaintiff injured in the forum state seeks to represent a nationwide class of 
plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there.82 The second question, whether 
the opinion is limited to only state courts or extends to federal courts, arises out 
of the last sentence in the Bristol-Myers opinion, in which the Court leaves open 
the question of whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court.83 
1. Bristol-Myers Does Not Apply to Class Actions 
The holding in Bristol-Myers applies only to mass actions and not class 
actions.84 This is first evidenced by the majority’s assertion that its holding was 
consistent with Shutts.85 In Shutts, the Court held it was consistent with Due 
Process to exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident class 
 
 79. Id. at 1781. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-00564 NC, 2017 WL 
4224723 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017). 
 82. Id. at *8; Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4. 
 83. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723 at *7; Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784. 
 84. See Robert S. Peck, Constricting Personal Jurisdiction, 53 TRIAL 26, 30 (“Defendants 
have already begun to argue that Bristol-Myers precludes class actions that involve out-of-state 
class members. The discussion of class actions in the decision, though, gives little credence to that 
claim.”). 
 85. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
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members despite them having no minimum contacts with the forum state.86 A 
state’s authority to resolve the claims of nonresident plaintiff class members, 
however, is entirely distinct from its authority to exercise jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant.87  
Further, Bristol-Myers applies only to mass actions because the citizenship 
of unnamed plaintiffs in class actions is not taken into account for personal 
jurisdiction purposes; the class action device expressly extends personal 
jurisdiction over unnamed class members.88 This is so because the term “party” 
indicates the applicability of certain procedural rules such as establishing proper 
personal jurisdiction,89 but in class actions, unnamed class members are not 
named on the complaint as parties in interest, and as such, do not need to 
establish proper personal jurisdiction.90 On the other hand, in mass actions such 
as in Bristol-Myers, each plaintiff is named as a party in interest and must 
establish proper personal jurisdiction.91 
2. Bristol-Myers Applies to Federal Courts Sitting in Diversity 
The holding in Bristol-Myers applies to federal courts whose subject-matter 
jurisdiction arises solely out of diversity jurisdiction. First, the Court’s statement 
was not an expression of a holding that its decision would not apply to a federal 
court; it was merely a refusal to opine on a question not before it since the facts 
did not involve a federal court.92 Additionally, federal courts routinely apply 
specific jurisdiction analyses to defendants that are before them solely on the 
basis of diversity jurisdiction, as the claims in such cases sound in state law.93 
When this happens, the concerns of Due Process and state sovereignty, as well 
as the burden on the defendant, remain prevalent.94  
When a federal court entertains only questions of federal law, however, a 
categorical extension of the Bristol-Myers opinion to federal courts is not 
warranted.95 The Bristol-Myers opinion centered on due process and the 
question of state sovereignty, but when a case is pending in federal court on the 
basis of federal question subject-matter jurisdiction, no such concerns are 
raised.96 This is because federal courts all represent the same federal sovereign, 
 
 86. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782-83. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Peck, supra note 84, at 26, 30. 
 89. Devlin v. Scardelliti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002). 
 90. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723 at *5. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at *4. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Monteville Sloan v. General Motors LLC, 16-CV-07244-EMC, 2018 WL 784049, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018). 
 96. Id. at *7. 
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not the sovereignty of a foreign state government.97 Thus, the decisive factor in 
a state court’s analysis, as recognized and applied by Bristol-Myers, becomes 
irrelevant for the federal court.98 
C. Relatedness Requirement After Bristol-Myers 
1. The Scope of the Relatedness Requirement Remains Unclear 
The Court’s opinion makes certain that parallel conduct inside the forum or 
a defendant’s similar contacts with third parties in the forum do not establish a 
sufficient connection for a nonresident’s claims to meet the requisite relatedness 
requirement. However, despite the Court’s attempt to narrow the scope of the 
relatedness element, it left no bright line rule for determining exactly what level 
of connection would be sufficient to prove a plaintiff’s claim arises out of a 
defendant’s contact with a forum state. The Court neglected to adopt an express 
test such as “substantial connection” or “but-for causation” leaving courts very 
little substantial guidance.99 
The strictest reading of the opinion would lead to the conclusion that a 
defendant’s contacts in the forum state must be the proximate cause of a 
plaintiff’s claim. However, recent applications of Bristol-Myers suggest that the 
connection need not be that stringent.100 Rather, some lower level of but-for 
causation is sufficient – as long as the defendant’s conduct was in the causal 
chain leading to the plaintiff’s suit, the contact was sufficiently related and 
specific jurisdiction was met.101  
For example, in Feller, a plaintiff sued for breach of contract due to an 
increase in price of an insurance policy.102 The policy was originally priced by 
the defendant company in California, but the increase ultimately came to fruition 
when the company was located in its new headquarters in Iowa.103 The 
allegation of breach was premised upon the original pricing of the policy and 
subsequent increase of that price; therefore, the original pricing of the policies 
was a link in the causal chain leading to the breach of contract injury, and 
specific jurisdiction in California was proper.104 Though the outcome in Feller 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Rhodes & Robinson, supra note 7 (explaining that “arises out of” implies that nearly 
all of the events giving rise to the suit took place in the forum, whereas “related to” and “connected 
to” are weaker terms implying that the conduct may be part of the chain of events leading to a 
claim, but perhaps not the basis for liability itself). 
 100. See Feller v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 216CV01378CASAJWX, 2017 WL 6453262 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017). 
 101. Id. at *4. 
 102. Id. at *1. 
 103. Id. at *6. 
 104. Id. 
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was in line with Bristol-Myers, Bristol-Myers did not mandate a standard of but-
for causation for the relatedness test; rather, the Feller court adopted this 
reasoning at its own discretion. 
2. The Relatedness Requirement is Fact-Intensive 
One certainty following Bristol-Myers is that the relatedness requirement 
analysis will continue to be fact-intensive. In establishing whether specific 
jurisdiction is proper, courts must examine very specific facts linking the 
defendant’s forum behavior to a plaintiff’s claim. For example, in Cortina, the 
court used the Bristol-Myers analysis and found specific jurisdiction based on 
findings of fact that nearly every clinical trial involved in studying the drug 
Plavix occurred in California.105 Because the basis for plaintiffs’ claim was the 
inadequacy of the clinical trials performed on Plavix, the court held the 
California activities were sufficient to create a direct connection between the 
defendant’s forum conduct and the plaintiffs’ claim.106 
3. Jurisdictional Discovery Becomes Critical 
The fact-intensiveness of the relatedness inquiry will result in an increase of 
crucial jurisdictional discovery, since before there was little reason to explore 
the affiliation between the defendant and the underlying cause of action to 
establish jurisdiction.107 This notion was acknowledged in In Re Nexus, where 
plaintiffs experiencing defects with their smartphones sued the two companies 
who developed the phones, Huawei and Google, in California.108 Huawei moved 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the question was how much 
evidence would be sufficient to establish the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of 
Huawei’s conduct in California.109  
Unlike in Bristol-Myers, where there was no proof that the research done in 
California was related to Plavix itself, here there were some facts that showed 
Huawei’s research and development efforts in California focused on Android 
interoperability – software used by Google.110 This left open the possibility that 
Huawei did perform relevant development of the product in California and the 
plaintiffs’ claims arose directly out of this conduct.111 As a result, the court held 
that limited jurisdictional discovery should take place regarding how much of 
Huawei’s research and development of the relevant smartphone took place in 
 
 105. Cortina v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 17-CV-00247-JST, 2017 WL 2793808, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Peck, supra note 84, at 29-30. 
 108. In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation, No. 17-CV-02185-BLF, 2018 WL 827958, 
at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) 
 109. Id. at *1-2, *5. 
 110. Id. at *5. 
 111. Id. 
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California.112 Following the Bristol-Myers opinion, more courts are sure to 
follow these footsteps in allowing more jurisdictional discovery.  
IV.  FUTURE IMPLICATIONS ON MASS LITIGATION 
The decision in Bristol-Myers was largely agreed upon by the Supreme 
Court, as eight justices supported the majority, while only Justice Sotomayor 
dissented.113 Her dissent raised concerns that may be shared by many plaintiffs’ 
attorneys handling nationwide mass actions.114 However, because the Bristol-
Myers decision has not greatly impacted the specific jurisdiction analysis, the 
concerns raised are not likely to come to fruition, negatively impacting plaintiffs 
in mass actions. Further, while the concerns are valid, judicial vehicles such as 
savings statutes, multidistrict litigation, and class actions act to counter the 
potential negative effects of the decision. 
A. The Dissent’s Concerns of Unfairness 
Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority that the nonresident 
plaintiffs’ claims were not sufficiently related to the defendant’s contacts in 
California. She argued that just because those plaintiffs were injured in other 
states did not mean their claims did not relate to the advertising and distribution 
efforts of Bristol-Myers Squibb in California.115 Her argument suggests that the 
relatedness requirement should be decided using a substantial connection or 
similar test rather than a more stringent test of proximate or but-for causation.116  
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is steeped in concerns that a narrow 
interpretation of the relatedness element will result in considerable unfairness, 
eliminating plaintiffs’ ability to hold corporations fully accountable for 
nationwide conduct and giving corporations a tool to prevent aggregation of 
claims.117 First, she asserts that going forward, it will be profoundly difficult to 
aggregate the claims of plaintiffs injured across the country to sue a defendant 
in a single, isolated action.118 Likewise, she claims it may become impossible to 
bring certain nationwide mass actions at all against defendants at home in 
different states or force plaintiffs to sue in far-flung jurisdictions.119 Finally, she 
claims that the majority’s decision will result in unnecessary piecemeal 
legislation and bifurcation of claims.120 Though valid, Justice Sotomayor’s 
concerns hold little weight when scrutinized. 
 
 112. Id. at *5-6. 
 113. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 114. Peck, supra note 84, at 28. 
 115. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1784, 1789. 
 118. Id. at 1789. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784. 
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B. Bristol-Myers Does Not Greatly Diminish the Plaintiffs’ Forum Options  
The Bristol-Myers decision has not altered much, if any, of the personal 
jurisdiction analysis—plaintiffs’ options for proper forums are not any narrower 
than before.121 After Tyrell, plaintiffs feared that representation of injured 
railroad workers would become difficult, as proper jurisdiction would be limited 
to where the plaintiff was injured, where the railroad is incorporated, and where 
it has its principal place of business.122 Plaintiffs also feared it would become 
difficult to sue corporations in state court for out-of-state injuries or resort to 
traveling to the defendant’s home state to sue no matter how far this would 
require the plaintiff to travel.123 Justice Sotomayor’s concerns directly mirror 
these sentiments, but Bristol-Myers did not create any restriction on personal 
jurisdiction narrower than those which Tyrell had already established—
jurisdiction is proper where the plaintiff was injured, or where general 
jurisdiction is proper.  
Considering Bristol-Myers did not alter the holding presented Tyrell, it will 
not become “profoundly difficult”124 for plaintiffs across the nation to aggregate 
their claims and sue a defendant in a single, isolated action. First, plaintiffs have 
the option of joining together and filing mass actions in their home state where 
specific jurisdiction is proper.125 Second, plaintiffs may still bring nationwide 
mass actions in any state where the defendant is subject to general 
jurisdiction.126 In Bristol-Myers, the plaintiffs could have properly sued in 
Delaware, New York, or possibly even New Jersey.127 
Bringing suit in a forum of general jurisdiction would not have resulted in 
any increased inconvenience to the plaintiffs—no particular state was home to a 
majority of the plaintiffs in the action, so no matter where the consolidated action 
was brought, most plaintiffs would have been litigating in a remote forum.128 
 
 121. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (Like in Bristol-Myers, the Tyrell 
court found that state courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a railroad merely because 
it did some business in the forum state. The Court relied on Goodyear and Daimler as well as due 
process concerns in holding that general jurisdiction was improper because the defendant was 
neither incorporated nor had its principle place of business in the forum state, and specific 
jurisdiction was appropriate with respect to only those claims related to business the defendant 
actually conducted in the forum state). 
 122. Jeffrey White, Switching Tracks on Jurisdiction, 54 TRIAL 56 (Feb. 2018). 
 123. Recent Case, B.N.S.F. Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 131 HARV. L. REV. 333, 341–42 (2017). 
 124. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789. 
 125. Id. at 1783. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (Although Bristol-Myers Squibb’s headquarters was located in New York, general 
personal jurisdiction may be appropriate in New Jersey, where the company maintained substantial 
operations, under the nerve center test set forth by the Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 
80-81 (2010)). 
 128. Id. at 1783–84 (Ninety-two plaintiffs were from Texas, eighty-six plaintiffs were from 
California, and seventy-one plaintiffs were from Ohio). 
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Plaintiffs may desire to choose a forum other than one of general jurisdiction 
because of friendlier laws or courtrooms, yet this type of forum shopping has 
long been looked down upon.129 The benefit of Bristol-Myers in reducing forum 
shopping outweighs any potential inconvenience to plaintiffs.  
C. Judicial Vehicles Counter the Negative Implications of Bristol-Myers 
1. Savings Statutes Protect Affected Plaintiffs’ Claims 
Those most affected by the Bristol-Myers opinion were those involved in 
talcum power litigation against corporate giant Johnson & Johnson. Thousands 
of plaintiffs across the county sued Johnson & Johnson alleging that the talcum 
powder in their products caused ovarian cancer.130 Mass actions were brought 
in plaintiff-friendly Missouri by plaintiffs who had never had any contact with 
the state, under a theory used by the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers—they were 
harmed out-of-state by the same type of activities that Johnson & Johnson 
conducted in Missouri.131 If nonresident plaintiffs were not able to properly 
invoke joinder to keep their cases in the mass action, they felt the immediate 
impact of the Bristol-Myers decision.132 In some cases, Johnson & Johnson 
immediately removed to federal court, and in others, judges declared mistrials 
and ended litigation when ninety-five percent of plaintiffs were from other 
states.133  
Though some may experience inconvenience or frustration by having their 
case dismissed from a jurisdiction known for doling out large awards to 
plaintiffs, Bristol-Myers will not be detrimental to their claims because savings 
statutes ultimately allow those plaintiffs to still have their day in court.134 Nearly 
every state has some version of a savings statute—a law allowing a plaintiff to 
re-file her claim in a state within a certain period of time after it was dismissed 
elsewhere for lack of jurisdiction.135 These statutes allow plaintiffs to re-file 
their claims even after the statute of limitations for the claim has expired, as long 
 
 129. See Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (A plaintiff’s 
choice of forum is accorded deference unless there is any indication that it is the result of forum 
shopping). 
 130. Joel Currier, Talcum Powder Lawsuits Find a Home in St. Louis – For Now, ST. LOUIS 
POST DISPATCH, (May 21, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/talcum-
powder-lawsuits-find-a-home-in-st-louis-for/article_64762c56-7046-59a5-b848-6c5c4f7343 
44.html [https://perma.cc/6XHJ-2CSX]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.; see also Peck, supra note 84, at 29–30 (referencing Swann v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 
1422CC09326-01 (E.D. Mo. June 19, 2017)). 
 133. Peck, supra note 84, at 29. 
 134. See generally C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Statute Permitting New Action After Failure of 
Original Action Commenced Within Period of Limitation, as Applicable in Cases Where Original 
Action Failed For Lack of Jurisdiction, 6 A.L.R.3d 1043 (1966) (updated weekly). 
 135. Id. 
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as their original suit was filed in good faith within the proper statutory period.136 
Thus, plaintiffs whose ongoing litigation was interrupted by the decision are still 
able to pursue relief in a proper jurisdiction. 
Because Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions, plaintiffs involved in 
mass actions will not be disadvantaged if their claims must be separated and re-
filed. If the holding were to apply to class actions, thereby eliminating 
jurisdiction over nonresident class members, a plaintiff might be dissuaded from 
re-asserting her claim because it is not worth enough to pursue individually.137 
Mass actions, however, are different in that each plaintiff pursues her own 
individual, often high value claim, and so her ability to recover will not be 
limited by re-filing in another proper jurisdiction.138 
2. Multidistrict Litigation Relives Concerns of Future Mass Action 
Litigation 
Although the Brisol Myers opinion does not hinder plaintiffs’ ability to file 
statewide mass actions where specific jurisdiction is proper, there is concern that 
more statewide mass actions and fewer nationwide mass actions will result in 
piecemeal legislation or bifurcation of claims. This in turn may result in dis-
uniformity in laws and a decrease in judicial economy.139 
Multidistrict litigation serves as one resolution to both of these problems for 
those cases that are removable to federal district courts.140 Multidistrict litigation 
promotes efficiency by taking actions filed across many states and in many 
districts and keeping them in one forum, eliminating the wasteful duplicative 
efforts of courts.141 It also ameliorates discovery challenges that arise from 
multiple horizontal litigations.142 Multidistrict litigation further promotes 
uniformity in the law.143 Courts have an interest in not having the rulings of one 
district judge undermine those of another, so multidistrict litigation acts to 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions - Past, Present, and Future, 92 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 998, 999–1000, 1009–10 (2017). 
 138. Id. at 1009–10. 
 139. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1682–83 (2017); see also Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process 
Due: Using Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the 
Public in Class and Other Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1024–31 (2017) 
(Arguments against aggregation are often framed as problems of due process including dis-
uniformity of interests and uneven successes of remedy distribution). 
 140. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1682–83 (Multidistrict litigation is one way of combining class 
actions and individual claims regarding one central issue into a single forum for pre-trial 
proceedings). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 1683. 
 143. Id. 
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prevent jurisdiction wars.144 By having one forum control the cases from across 
the country, multidistrict litigation eliminates issues of forum shopping.145 
3. Class Actions Can Be an Alternative  
One final implication that the decision may have is an increase in class 
actions for nationwide aggregation.146 Although traditionally, mass toxic tort 
cases have been considered more appropriate for mass litigation rather than class 
action,147 there has been an increase in tort aggregation, to the point that it has 
become commonplace.148 In both class action rules and personal jurisdiction 
laws alike, the concern is the legitimacy of a court’s authority to bind litigants.149 
The class device, as part of the development of aggregate litigation, 
demonstrates a willingness to expand jurisdiction over nonresidents, and will 
serve as an adequate alternative to those affected by Bristol-Myers.150 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Bristol-Myers narrowed the scope of the relatedness 
requirement of specific jurisdiction in holding that when a nonresident plaintiff 
is injured by merely the same type of activity the defendant conducted in the 
forum, the plaintiff’s claim is not sufficiently related to the defendant’s forum 
contacts in order to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Despite this holding, 
the Court failed to adopt a bright line test for determining what level of 
connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim is 
sufficient to meet this relatedness requirement. 
Because the Bristol-Myers holding did not significantly alter the specific 
jurisdiction analysis, courts are still left with freedom to determine what 
connections establish relatedness based on the facts of individual cases. While 
the decision may give rise to an increase in jurisdictional discovery, it will not 
result in negative consequences for mass action plaintiffs. Plaintiffs remain free 
to pursue aggregated actions in the places where the plaintiffs can establish that 
the defendant’s activities gave rise to their claim, or where the defendant is 
subject to general jurisdiction. 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1685. 
 146. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97 (2017) (Class actions are on the rise from a recent decline, and Bristol-Myers 
may help act as a reprieve from years of case law adverse to class action aggregation). 
 147. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 1684–85 (In personal injury cases, individual questions of 
causation, damages, and applicable law often require state by state evaluation). 
 148. Resnik, supra note 139, at 1025 (Mass torts constitute ninety percent of multidistrict 
litigation). 
 149. Id. at 1026. 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2019] CAN YOU RELATE? 523 
Judicial resources like savings statutes, multidistrict litigation, and class 
actions act as safeguards to some of the negative implications the decision would 
have otherwise had. As such, the future of mass action litigation is safe in the 
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